New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 34

Issue 2

Article 4

10-19-2022

Bounded Confidence: How AI Could Exacerbate Social Media’s
Homophily Problem
Dylan Weber
Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford University and Artis Research

Scott Atran
Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford University and Artis Research

Rich Davis
Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford University and Artis Research

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Information Literacy Commons, and the
Social Media Commons

Recommended Citation
Weber, Dylan; Atran, Scott; and Davis, Rich (2022) "Bounded Confidence: How AI Could Exacerbate Social
Media’s Homophily Problem," New England Journal of Public Policy: Vol. 34: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol34/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for
inclusion in New England Journal of Public Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For
more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

New England Journal of Public Policy

Bounded Confidence: How AI Could Exacerbate Social Media’s
Homophily Problem
Dylan Weber, Scott Atran, and Rich Davis
Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford University and Artis Research

Abstract
The advent of the Internet was heralded as a revolutionary development in the democratization of
information. It has emerged, however, that online discourse on social media tends to narrow the
information landscape of its users. This dynamic is driven by the propensity of the network
structure of social media to tend toward homophily; users strongly prefer to interact with content
and other users that are similar to them. We review the considerable evidence for the ubiquity of
homophily in social media, discuss some possible mechanisms for this phenomenon, and present
some observed and hypothesized effects. We also discuss how the homophilic structure of social
media makes it uniquely vulnerable to artificial-intelligence-driven, automated influence
campaigns.
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Since the advent of the Internet, the literature has debated how such a large shift in the information
landscape will affect the function of democracies. In the early years of the twenty-first century,
many argued that since the Internet offered the possibility of larger, more direct discussion among
the populace as well as greatly enhanced access to information, its adoption would be a boon for
democratic society.1 The prevailing sentiment at the time (as it is now) was that a functioning
democracy is synonymous with healthy deliberation. Others cautioned, however, that an
information sphere lacking intermediaries and offering a virtually infinite array of information
sources would foster deliberation that is anything but healthy.2 These scholars cautioned that given
the array of choice that the Internet offers, finite time to spend consuming information, and the
well-established psychological tendencies of confirmation bias and selective exposure, the Internet
would not broaden the information horizons of its users but narrow them. They predicted that given
the choice, people would spend their time on the Internet interacting with those with whom they
already agreed and consuming information from sources that confirmed their prior views; in other
words, they predicted that the interaction structure of the Internet would tend toward homophily.
In the past fifteen years, the advent of social media and its associated meta data has opened the
door to empirical answers to these questions and the answers are stark.
In the first section we discuss the considerable evidence that the network structure of social
media does tend toward homophily, present some possible mechanisms for that tendency, and
outline some observed and hypothesized effects. In the second section we employ mathematical
modeling to illustrate how networks that are prone to homophily are also susceptible to polarizing
agents. Finally, we’ll discuss how artificial intelligence techniques could be leveraged to deploy
automated polarizing agents at scale to exploit the homophilic structure of social media.

Social Media’s Homophily Problem
Homophilic Structure of Social Media
Since its advent, there has been concern in academic circles about the formation of “echo
chambers” on social media.3 But until the past seven years or so, there has been a dearth of
empirical investigation into the question whether such communities were actually emerging. These
concerns were catapulted into the mainstream during the 2016 US presidential election, prompting
a large number of studies looking into the question by leveraging large social media datasets.
Because of the variation in specific methods and in the definition of “echo chamber” across these
studies, we first offer some definitions to put all the findings on common ground.
Definition 1 A network is a collection of nodes and a collection of edges that connect the nodes.
Definition 2 Given a network and a quantity defined on its nodes that is a priori independent of
the network edge structure, we say that the network is homophilic with respect to the quantity if
nodes are more likely to be connected in the network if they have a similar value of the quantity.
In short, a network is homophilic if “users of a feather connect together.” All the research we
review into identifying the existence of echo chambers on social media is unified in the sense that
it aims to study homophily in the networks with respect to some measure of ideology on a given
issue or issues (usually political). These studies also are generally unified in their methods. First,
they collect a large social media dataset on an issue (or issues) in question. Next, they define a
methodology for quantifying each user’s ideology on the issue in question. Finally, they define a
scheme for structuring their dataset into a network and quantifying homophily with respect to the
ideology measure—this step is usually accomplished through some type of clustering of the
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network interactions in the ideology space of the users. The network structure is always drawn
from the inherent network structure present in social media data from the various interactions users
can have with each other (e.g., following, friendship, commenting, retweeting). The ideology
measure is usually computed using one of two general strategies. The first, which we call the “link
to labels” strategy, involves identifying a list of social media entities with wide followings (e.g.,
politicians, news outlets, Facebook pages) and asking a group of subject-matter experts to label the
ideology values of each entity. The ideology of a given user in the dataset can then be computed
from the ideology values of the labeled entities to which the user is connected in the network
structure. The second, which we call the “scaling” strategy, uses features independent of the
network structure that is being examined and a traditional statistical or deep learning model to fit
an ideology value for each user. Surprisingly, even given the range of issues that they examine,
this body of research is also remarkably unified in its findings; social media has a strikingly
homophilic structure.
One of the first quantitative studies to examine homophily in social media data using a scaling
strategy was conducted by a team led by Pablo Barberá.4 They introduce a statistical model that
uses the user-follows-politician bipartite network on Facebook as the main feature to fit ideology
values for the users. Using this strategy, they found homophily in the friendship network drawn
from a Facebook dataset that concerns the 2012 presidential election, which demonstrates that this
tendency was not unique to the 2016 race. Using the same methodology, Barberá and colleagues
find a similar trend across a collection of other political issues, including the 2013 government
shutdown, minimum wage, and marriage equality.5 In two studies of Twitter, Kiran Garimella and
colleagues study Twitter and define the ideology of a user through the link to labels strategy in the
first study, and the scaling method introduced by Barberá’s team in the second.6 In addition to
users, they quantify the ideology of tweets produced by users that include a link to news outlets
through the link to labels strategy. They find pronounced homophily in Twitter networks
discussing gun control, Obamacare, and abortion; users strongly tended to both produce and
consume tweets whose ideology matched with their own as well as interact with users whose
ideology measure was close to their own. Interestingly, when this analysis was repeated in
networks corresponding to several nonpolitical topics, homophily was not observed; this effect was
also observed by Barberá’s team.7
Cinelli and colleagues also find pronounced homophily in the Twitter conversation about
abortion as well as vaccines using the link to labels strategy.8 In both conversations they find two
well-defined groups of users with disparate ideology values who strongly preferred to interact only
within their groups. They extend this analysis to Facebook, with similar results. But when the same
methodology was repeated using data from Reddit and Gab, users tended to cluster into only one
group. On Reddit this group reflected a moderately liberal ideology, on Gab the singular group was
strongly conservative. This result suggests that entire social platforms are echo chambers with
respect to certain issues. The existence of homophily in the vaccination debate on Twitter is
confirmed by Mønsted and colleagues using a scaling strategy, and the analysis is extended to
Facebook by Schmidt and colleagues using the link to labels strategy where homophily is identified
as well.9
Homophily is not limited to a specific set of topics. For example, the authors of “Exposure to
Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook,” “Quantifying Social Media’s Political
Space,” and “Sharing Political News: The Balancing Act of Intimacy and Socialization in Selective
Exposure” do not limit their datasets to content pertaining to a specific issue and instead attempt to
capture the political space on Facebook writ large.10 Even in this much-less-focused domain, all
three studies find pronounced homophily. It does not appear, however, that the tendency toward
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homophily is constricted to topics that are explicitly political. In “Echo Chambers on Facebook,”
“Debunking in a World of Tribes,” and “Homophily and Polarization in the Age of
Misinformation,” the authors examine a large Facebook dataset consisting of all the content from
a large list of Facebook pages labeled by subject matter experts as “science” or “conspiracy.”11
They define the ideology of a user through the proportion of their activity directed at science or
conspiracy pages and define a user as “polarized” if at least 95 percent of their interactions are with
pages of one type. They find that of users who interacted with a conspiracy page that 91.53 percent
were polarized toward conspiracy and of users who interacted with a science page that 76.79
percent were polarized toward science. Additionally, they find homophily in the Facebook
friendship network with respect to this ideology measure— those polarized to conspiracy were
very unlikely to be friends with those polarized toward science and vice versa. A similar trend is
found in analyses of the news consumption patterns of users on Facebook: users tend to interact
only with a small group of similarly aligned outlets in lieu of all other news sources. Users who
consume the same group of pages are much more likely to interact with each other. 12 Finally, the
tendency toward homophily on social media has been observed in multiple locales outside the
United States as demonstrated by Grömping, Cota, and colleagues, and Barberá and colleagues.13
Mechanisms of Homophily
There is much debate about what could be driving the striking tendency toward homophily
observed in social media, and research into such mechanisms is still in its early stages. Some point
to the algorithmic curation of content as a main culprit; they caution that it could cause users to be
exposed only to content for which they have previously demonstrated an affinity, otherwise known
as a “filter bubble.”14 But there is a growing body of evidence that this effect, though it may exist,
might be less pronounced than feared.15 Garret offers a good review.16
Bakshy and colleagues find that “there is on average slightly less cross-cutting content:
conservatives see approximately 5 percent less cross-cutting content compared to what friends
share, while liberals see about 8 percent less ideologically diverse content.” In the same study, the
authors find that while individuals may be exposed to cross-cutting content, they engage with it at
much lower rates.17 Garret admits strong evidence for this phenomena as well, coining the term
“engagement echo chamber.” So while algorithmic curation might not place users in a filter bubble,
their own preferences might be causing them to create it for themselves. Scaling effects might also
play a role. In “Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network,” the authors report on a
longitudinal study of a large university community using e-mail interactions, demographic data,
and class registration data to create a very complete picture of the social network in the university
and its evolution.18 They find that even a mild “local” preference to associate with like others can
cause “induced homophily” in the interaction network—the choice with whom to interact becomes
constrained; the compounding of these effects creates stark observed homophily at the population
level.
One of the main shifts in the media landscape caused by the advent of social media is an
explosion in the number of available sources for information. In this environment, the wellestablished psychological phenomenon of “selective exposure,” introduced by Festinger, can have
a particularly strong effect. Selective exposure refers to “the phenomenon whereby people choose
to focus on information in their environment that is congruent with and confirms their current
attitudes in order to avoid or reduce cognitive dissonance.”19 Berkowitz offers a comprehensive
review.20 Both Lewandowsky and Spohr point out that in such high-choice media environments,
the combination of finite attention and selective exposure could drive users to engage almost
4
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completely with content that agrees with their prior views, even if they are exposed to cross-cutting
content. These fears are realized in the data.21 In “Anatomy of News Consumption of Facebook,”
the authors show that, initially, users on Facebook engage with a fairly large variety of pages, but
as time goes on they converge to engaging with only a small group.22 This tendency is evident of
users expending effort to find what they like and then sticking to it; in other words, evidence for
selective exposure at work. This effect is confirmed in a subsequent study.23 Additionally, both of
these studies find that, across all users, the most active users focused their attention on the fewest
number of pages, a finding that Cinelli and colleagues report as well.24
Barberá and colleagues were early adopters of the idea that selective exposure could be a main
driver of the emergence of homophily in social media. They pose a successful ideological scaling
model that frames the following of a politician or news source on social media as a costly action
(capturing finite attention) and encodes a preference for following those whose ideology values are
similar to one’s own (encoding homophily in the following network). The assumption that the
structure of the observed following network was driven by users choosing to follow other users
who were close in ideology resulted in fitted ideology values that exactly replicated ideology values
for politicians computed from voting records and values for ordinary citizens computed from selfreporting on Twitter profiles, campaign contribution records, and voter registration records
independently.25 Selective exposure is not a tendency induced by social media usage; there is strong
evidence of its effects in traditional media consumption outside social media as well. 26 This
psychological tendency, in combination with the scale of information available on social media,
however, is likely a driver of the striking degree of homophily observed in social networks. All the
empirical research into selective exposure on social media illuminates the existence of large,
homophilic clusters of users who selectively expose themselves to information that is often
verifiably false.27
Why would users prefer to expose themselves to information that is falsifiable? Kahan offers
an explanation echoed by Spohr28; this preference is likely a mechanism to establish and maintain
group identity. Far from being irrational, Kahan argues, the propensity to ignore facts in favor of
agreeing with one’s group is rational in the sense that any gain resulting from an individual shift
in ideological position is far outweighed by the perceived cost from the resulting social backlash
and the loss of all the social advantages group membership carries. This idea is borne out
empirically in social media data as well. Zollo and colleagues exposed users who had a preference
for content produced by conspiracy pages to a variety of debunking content. Conspiracy users very
rarely engaged with such content. When they did, the action resulted in their becoming more
polarized toward the conspiracy camp.29 Garimella and colleagues find that the community
punishes users on Twitter who are “bipartisan” in the sense that they both consume and share
content across the ideological spectrum in question. These users have lower network centrality and
lower engagement. Conversely, the narrower in ideological scope a user’s produced content was
(given sufficient activity), the more engagement they received.30
Effects of Homophily
The 2016 election launched concerns that social media might act as an amplifier of misinformation
into the mainstream. There is substantial evidence that these concerns are justified. Allcott and
colleagues analyze a collection of 156 false news stories circulated on Facebook concerning the
2016 US presidential election. These 156 stories were shared a combined 37.9 million times. They
estimate that every US adult on Facebook, on average, saw and remembered at least one false story.
They hint at the role of homophily in the prolific spread of false news, by showing through survey
work that both Democrats and Republicans are 14 percent more likely to believe news that is
5
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ideologically congruent, and that a strong correlate with ideologically aligned inference is selfreporting of a large share of Facebook friends having the same political ideology.31 Research
leveraging large-scale social media data brings the role of homophily to center stage.
As noted, users on social media organize themselves into homophilic clusters with respect to
ideology on many issues. This formation appears to be driven, at least in part, by selective
exposure, and users in these clusters strongly favor ideologically aligned content. In light of these
facts, it is reasonable to suppose that homophily might contribute to the spread of misinformation
on social media. Modeling of information diffusion processes on real social media network
structures appear to support this hypothesis. Cota and colleagues identify the presence of strong
homophily in the network structure surrounding the impeachment of then Brazilian president
Dilma Rousseff.32 In order to examine how homophily might affect information spread in the
network, they simulate slightly modified versions of the classical epidemiological susceptibleinfected-susceptible (SIS) and susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) models using the actual
measured social network as the contact network for the models. 33 They find that information
diffusion on the homophilic network is biased toward individuals who share the same political
opinion; given a user and a piece of content received by that user, it is very likely that said content
originated with another user of the same political leaning. This same methodology is extended to
a much wider range of issues and platforms with confirmed homophily by Cinelli and colleagues
with similar results; in all issues where a homophilic network was observed, users with a given
ideology are much more likely to be reached by information that is spread by users with a similar
ideology.34
One might be tempted to argue that the ease with which information propagates within
homophilic network components (and the symmetric difficulty that it has propagating between
them) is merely a structural consequence of the network topology and doesn’t necessarily imply
that homophily aids the spread of misinformation. Though network structure surely plays a role,
this argument ignores the mechanisms that likely drive the formation of homophilic network
structures in the first place. As discussed, there is much evidence that people prefer information
that is aligned with their ideology even when this information is verifiably false. Thus, it is only
reasonable to expect that false information could widely propagate in a homophilic network
component if it aligns with the ideology of the component.
For example, Del Vicario and colleagues find that homophily is the main mechanism behind
the effective spread of content. They analyze content cascades on Facebook relating to science
news and conspiracy news (derived from the same large dataset studied in “Echo Chambers on
Facebook”).35 A content cascade is the successive sharing of a piece of content allowing it to spread
through a social network. One can think of a cascade as a tree structure branching through the
network, and rooted at the user who originally posted the content. Del Vicario and colleagues
define the polarization of a user with respect to science and conspiracy as a value between -1 and
1 via the link-to-labels strategy using a list of labeled science and conspiracy pages; a user with
polarization -1 likes only science-related pages, a user with polarization 1 likes only conspiracyrelated pages.36 They then define the edge homogeneity of a friendship link between users as the
product of the user’s polarization values: edge homogeneity is positive when two users have the
same ideology and negative when their ideologies differ. This method allows them to study the
role of homophily in cascade dynamics by examining the average edge homogeneity of viral
cascades. Strikingly, they find that the average edge homogeneity of a cascade is always
significantly positive. Science-related content is circulated only by users polarized toward scienceand conspiracy-related content is circulated only by users polarized toward conspiracy.
These findings suggest that homophily is necessary for large viral cascades to occur; in a
6
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sufficiently sized heterophilous network, it would be rare to find the multitude of positive-edge
homogeneity paths necessary to facilitate a viral cascade. The more homophilic a network is, the
larger the size of the cascades it can facilitate. The research also suggests that in addition to being
seeded in a homophilic network component, content must align with the ideology of the component
in order to initiate a cascade of shares. Though Del Vicario and colleagues do not attempt to verify
any of the content in the cascades they study, they do find that conspiracy cascades are on average
much larger than science cascades. If one makes the (not-so-strong) assumption that the conspiracy
set of content contained more false information, one could infer that false information spreads more
effectively.
Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral make this inference concrete. They studied the structure of viral
cascades on Twitter having content that was verified by independent fact checkers as true or false.
They found that false information spreads much more effectively than truth and that this spread is
driven by individuals:
Whereas the truth rarely diffused to more than 1000 people, the top 1% of false-news
cascades routinely diffused to between 1000 and 100,000 people. Falsehood reached more
people at every depth of a cascade than the truth, meaning that many more people retweeted
falsehood than they did the truth. The spread of falsehood was aided by its virality, meaning
that falsehood did not simply spread through broadcast dynamics but rather through peerto-peer diffusion characterized by a viral branching process. It took the truth about six times
as long as falsehood to reach 1500 people and 20 times as long as falsehood to reach a
cascade depth of 10. As the truth never diffused beyond a depth of 10, we saw that falsehood
reached a depth of 19 nearly 10 times faster than the truth reached a depth of 10. Falsehood
also diffused significantly more broadly and was retweeted by more unique users than the
truth at every cascade depth.37
Combined with the insights of Del Vicario and colleagues, this finding suggests that the
prolificness of false news on social media can be explained by two factors that are likely working
in concert: false news is seeded in more homophilic network components than the truth or it is
more aligned with the ideology of the network component it is seeded in than the truth or both.
Though the wide spread of misinformation on social media facilitated by homophily can
hardly be disputed, some have questioned its real world effects (especially in elections).38 Research
into the causal effects and mechanisms of how information received on social media affects realworld decision-making is in its infancy. But as an example case study, social media data on the
topic of vaccines presents some striking correlations. A 2020 report by the Center for Countering
Digital Hate found that social media accounts held by anti-vaccine advocates had increased their
following by at least 7.8 million people since 2019. At that time, 31 million people followed antivaccine groups on Facebook, with 17 million people subscribing to similar accounts on YouTube.39
These communities are highly homophilic, and homophily appears to be a main driver in the spread
of the misinformation that defines these groups.40 Cinelli and colleagues, for example, show that
the entire platform Gab is a homophilic cluster with respect to vaccine stance and subsequently
demonstrate that vaccine misinformation spread most effectively on Gab.41
Perhaps most worrying, Johnson and colleagues demonstrate that anti-vaccine clusters are
“winning” on Facebook despite their smaller overall size when compared with pro-vaccine
clusters. Anti-vaccine clusters occupied more central network positions and were more entangled
with each other (homophily) and with clusters that were identified as being undecided with respect
to vaccines. This last point shows that anti-vaccine clusters have a greater opportunity to spread
their views to undecided clusters.42
7
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A modeling effort undertaken in the same study suggests that if the current dynamic remains
unchanged, then anti-vaccine discourse could dominate the conversation within the next decade.
Spohr notes that for users in homophilic communities where misinformation is spreading (such as
anti-vaccine communities), availability bias would likely impact their decision making.43
Availability bias refers to the tendency of humans to over-rely on information that is easily recalled
when making a decision. Since more recent information is more easily recalled, this over-reliance
results in a heavier weighting of recent information in the decision-making process.44 Spohr points
out that if misinformation is spreading in a homophilic community, then users in that community
are likely to make real-world decisions based on that misinformation as they receive all their
information (and therefore all recent information) from within the community. At the time of
writing, the CDC estimates that 32.8 percent of eligible Americans were not fully vaccinated
against COVID-19.
Sunstein gives a stark warning about one of the possible malign effects of homophily in “The
Law of Group Polarization.”45 He notes that with marked regularity, empirical studies find that
group deliberation results in the group polarizing in the direction of the initial group tendency: a
group of vaccine skeptics is likely to be even more skeptical after conferring with one another,
those in favor of stringent gun control will likely favor even stronger restrictions after discussion,
those who entertain the possibility that the earth is flat will more strongly subscribe to the belief
after interacting with each other, and so on. Sunstein calls this phenomenon “the law of group
polarization.” Because of the pronounced homophily in social media networks, the law of group
polarization does not paint an optimistic picture with respect to social media’s ability to foster
healthy deliberation in society. Instead, it predicts that continued social media interaction in
homophilic networks with respect to a given issue will increase polarization in the population on
that issue.
The picture becomes gloomier when considering the law of group polarization in the context
of social media’s homophily-driven vulnerability to misinformation. Sunstein notes that the
process through which group polarization from deliberation occurs likely shares many qualities of
informational cascades. Misinformation could exacerbate the size and speed of such “polarization
cascades.” Consider, for example, a homophilic network component of anti-vaccine users, where
one of the more extreme users begins espousing the (untrue) claim that vaccines are really intended
to insert a government-tracked microchip and should thus be avoided. Several other, more extreme,
users adopt the claim on the basis of its congruence with their ideology alone. Sunstein notes that
one of the mechanisms of the law of group polarization is that often the most extreme members of
a group have the most persuasive power at their disposal. This notion is supported by social media
data; as we noted earlier, activity, engagement, and network centrality all correlate with ideological
extremity. Next, through persuasive arguments rooted in ideology, the extreme initial adopters of
the government-control theory successfully persuade a plurality of their more moderate (but still
anti-vaccine) compatriots. At this point, cascade effects become prominent.
Sunstein points out that the beliefs that others espouse carry an informational externality about
what it makes sense to believe. Following the adoption of the government-control view by
convinced moderates, those individuals most initially hesitant to the view (but still anti-vaccine)
will likely adopt it as they are incentivized both by its congruence with their existing ideology
(vaccines are bad) and by the fact that many of their peers have adopted it. Finally, once the view
is adopted by the whole group it can be used as the basis of further persuasive arguments and be
accepted as a known fact.
At the end of this process not only has the anti-vaccine community become more polarized
toward anti-vaccine views (because they also now believe them to be a government conspiracy),
8
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they have incorporated a piece of misinformation into the epistemology of their community,
thereby making it more susceptible to further polarization. Sunstein notes that the other likely
mechanism underlying the tendency of deliberating homophilic groups to polarize is the existence
of a skewed argument pool. Since the deliberating group shares an ideology, most of the persuasive
arguments available to the group skew in the direction of the shared ideology—repetition of these
arguments among the group further polarizes the group. Adding ideology-congruent
misinformation to this dynamic has the effect of expanding the pro-ideology argument pool,
causing further polarization. This is perhaps one of the most dangerous possible effects of
homophily in our current information landscape. As the polarization process iterates, homophilic
communities are susceptible to incorporating more and more misinformation to their joint
conception of what is known and knowable.
Lewandowsky also worries about the creation of alternative epistemologies in communities
where misinformation readily spreads. He writes:
The framing of the current post-truth malaise as “misinformation” that can be corrected or
debunked fails to capture the full scope of the problem. This framing at least tacitly implies
that misinformation is a blemish on the information landscape—our mirror of reality—that
can be cleared up with a suitable corrective disinfectant. This framing fails to capture the
current state of public discourse: the post-truth problem is not a blemish on the mirror. The
problem is that the mirror is a window into an alternative reality.46
When a homophilic community has constructed an understanding of the world for itself that
is based (at least in part) on ideologically aligned misinformation that spreads throughout the
group, the argument can be made that members within the community have taken steps toward
experiencing identity fusion with the group. Identity fusion occurs when an individual’s personal
self (characteristics that make someone a unique person) and their social self (characteristics that
align the person with certain groups) become joined; individuals who have experienced identity
fusion feel a profound “oneness” with the group.47 Identity-fusion measures have been shown to
predict an individual’s willingness to fight and die on the group’s behalf.48 At this point homophilydriven echo chambers are not just narrowing information landscapes and degrading discourse, they
are breeding extremism.

Modeling Homophily through Bounded Confidence
As previously discussed, one of the major effects of the introduction of social media to the
information environment is the removal of intermediaries in informational sources, as well as the
creation of the possibility of direct interaction with a larger group of individuals. Thus, the process
of opinion formation on social media can be seen as an example of self-organized dynamics: largescale behaviors emerge without a central authority, much like the behavior of a flock of birds or a
shoal of fish. To study how small-scale individual interactions can result in large-scale structure
like the observed homophily in social media, agent-based models of opinion formation are often
employed. Here, an individual’s opinion is modeled as a continuous value on a one-dimensional
spectrum that changes in accordance with that individual’s connections with other individuals in a
social network modeled as a directed graph. A given individual feels a “push” or “pull” exerted on
their opinion value by those who interact with it (point at it in the directed graph) according to
prescribed interaction rules.
Most models in the literature have an interaction rule that encodes an assumption of “local
consensus.” In the absence of other interactions, when one individual interacts with another, the
interaction exerts a pull on the second individual’s opinion until that second individual’s opinion
9
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is the same as the first one’s. When two individuals interact, they exert a mutual pull on each
other’s opinion and will eventually reach a consensus in the middle of their original opinions.
Often, the structure of the social network changes depending on the distribution of opinions in the
population. For example, two individuals might begin interacting/cease interacting (resulting in an
edge being added/deleted in the network) if their opinion values become close enough together/too
far apart. The entire collection of opinions is then allowed to evolve until it reaches (or does not
reach) an equilibrium state.
A hallmark of the study of these models is examining how the interplay between the topology
of the underlying network and the interaction rules affect the distribution of opinions among the
agents. Much of the mathematical literature exploring such models is concerned with studying
conditions that cause evolution to a consensus (all agents have the same opinion value) in
equilibrium. As with much mathematical analysis, simpler cases prove very instructive. By
examining the case where the structure of the social network remains unchanged throughout the
evolution of the model, it has been shown that a necessary condition for the emergence of a
consensus (in the case of an attractive interaction rule) is the persistence of a suitable degree of
connectivity in the network.49 This allows for heterophilic interactions: agents with disparate
opinions interact and because of the attractive nature of the interaction rule, eventually agree.
One might assume that interaction rules carrying a local consensus assumption cause the
emergence of a global consensus to be a ubiquitous feature; but it does not. The manner in which
agents are connected in the underlying network has a large effect on the distribution of opinions
observed among the agents. One of the more well-studied models, known as the “boundedconfidence model,” was introduced by Hegselmann and Krause.50 Here, the connections between
agents are dynamic: a connection forms between agents when their opinions are within an
interaction range. If two agents have opinions within the interaction range, they attract each other;
otherwise they feel no influence from each other. This dynamic causes the formation of “clusters”
of opinions in the longtime limit to be a generic behavior; consensus is rare. For this reason, much
of the study of this class of models has focused on analytically characterizing the clustering
behavior.51
The interaction range in bounded-confidence dynamics causes the underlying social network
to be homophilic; agents interact only with agents who are sufficiently similar in ideology. This
tendency causes the social network to quickly become disconnected into a collection of echo
chambers that share ideology, preventing a consensus from occurring even though agents who do
interact attract each other. The bounded-confidence interaction rule encodes the previously
discussed tendency of selective exposure; agents interact and agree with those who are close to
them in ideology and ignore the rest. The interaction networks generated by bounded confidence
type models have been seen in many cases to replicate the homophilic interaction patterns seen in
real social media data.52
We employ the bounded-confidence interaction rule to examine how populations that are
prone to selective exposure are susceptible to misinformation. To do this, we introduce the notion
of a polarizing agent. In a normative social network, agents both feel and exert influence. A
polarizing agent exerts influence only on those to whom it is connected in the social network and
does not adjust its opinion value as a result of its interactions. This is also the role of misinformation
in real social networks. To illustrate the effects of polarizing agents on homophilic social networks,
we perform a series of simulations of the bounded confidence dynamics in the presence of
polarizing agents and without them (see Figure 1). In the top plot of Figure 1 we simulate the
bounded confidence dynamics among a population of two hundred agents without the presence of
polarizing agents. The selective exposure mechanism encoded in the bounded-confidence
10

New England Journal of Public Policy
interaction rule causes the underlying social network to become homophilic, and two clusters of
agents emerge (corresponding to two homophilic components of the social network); notice,
however, that the variance in opinion of the entire collection of agents decreases over the evolution
of the model. In the bottom plot of Figure 1 we repeat the simulation from the same initial condition
and add polarizing agents (shown in red) at opinion values 1.6 and -1.6. In this case, two clusters
of agents also emerge; however every agent in each cluster eventually takes on the opinion of the
polarizing agents closest to its cluster. The clusters have much more separation in ideology in the
presence of polarizing agents. This increased susceptibility to polarization is reflected in the
variance in opinion of the population, which increases over the entire evolution in contrast to the
case without polarizing agents.

Figure 1. In the top plot, the bounded-confidence dynamics are simulated with 200 agents without the
presence of polarizing agents. In the bottom plot the dynamics are simulated from the same initial state in
the presence of polarizing agents (shown in red) at opinion values 1.6 and -1.6. In the top simulation,
homophily in the interaction network causes the formation of two clusters of agents however the variance
of the overall collection of agents decreases. In the presence of polarizing agents (shown in red), the
variance increases over the course of the simulation, indicating the susceptibility of the homophilic clusters
to further polarization.

It is possible to induce consensus in a population of agents prone to homophily by imbuing
some of the agents with a moderating tendency. In keeping with the bounded-confidence
interaction rule, cluster formation is equivalent to a fragmentation of the interaction network into
homophilic components. If the connectivity of the interaction network is maintained, the
attractive nature of the interaction rule should result in a consensus. It has been mathematically
proven that if there are several moderating agents that do not adjust their opinion value if the
interaction network is close to severing, then a consensus is reached in a population otherwise
evolving according to the bounded-confidence rule.53
In Figure 2 we examine the effects of polarizing agents on a population that includes
moderating agents evolving according to the bounded-confidence interaction. In the top two plots,
the bounded-confidence dynamics are simulated in a population that includes only moderating
agents. The right top plot shows the entire evolution and the left top plot shows the first twenty
time units to give a better sense of the role of the moderating agents. Since the moderating agents
do not adjust their opinions when the interaction network is close to fragmenting and begin
evolving again only when this “danger” has passed, the connectivity of the interaction network is
maintained throughout the evolution. The original two homophilic clusters do form initially (as
well as a new moderate one); but the moderating agents cause these clusters to eventually merge
11
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and a consensus is reached. In the bottom plot we perform the same simulation in the presence of
polarizing agents. Though a new moderate cluster does emerge, the majority of the population still
become polarized, as evidenced by the increasing variance. Since polarizing agents never need to
adjust their opinions to achieve their “goal,” and moderating agents do, an impasse is reached.
Connectivity of the interaction network is maintained; but most of the agents become polarized
and the moderate regions of the ideology spectrum are populated mostly by moderating agents and
the small new moderate cluster.

Figure 2. In the top two plots, the bounded-confidence dynamics are simulated in a population that includes
moderating agents but not polarizing agents. The top-right plot shows the entire evolution and the top-left
plot shows the first 20 time units to give a better intuition as to the role of the moderators. The moderating
agents maintain the connectivity of the interaction network and a consensus is reached. In the bottom plot
the same simulation is repeated but with the addition of polarizing agents. The moderating agents do result
in the formation of a moderate cluster but the polarizing agents succeed in polarizing the majority of the
population as indicated by the increasing variance.

These theoretical results suggest that moderating from the middle is not sufficient to prevent
polarization in a population prone to homophily if polarizing agents (misinformation) are present.
In this setting, it seems that the only hope for consensus is to “cut off” the polarizing agents from
the population and allow the moderating agents to depolarize the population without competition
from the polarizers. As discussed earlier, it has been shown in real social media data that moderate
or bipartisan users are less successful than their extreme counterparts in several ways and that
debunking or moderating messages directed at homophilic communities are usually ignored.
Additionally, there is a growing body of evidence that “deplatforming” polarizers is an effective
12

New England Journal of Public Policy
strategy for mitigating polarization in the rest of the population.54

Artificial Intelligence as a Polarizing Agent
Social media’s tendency to organize into homophilic clusters and the resulting vulnerability of the
clusters to polarization create a landscape ripe for exploitation by malign actors. The narrowing of
the information landscape that occurs in a homophilic cluster allows for the values important to
such a cluster to be easily characterized. These values can then be wedges that when properly
deployed could be used to shift the cluster’s opinion on other issues.
To illustrate our point, we return to the example of a conspiracy rumor about government
microchipping being seeded in an anti-vaccine cluster. We noted that the spreading of the
conspiracy rumor in the anti-vaccine cluster had two consequences for that cluster: it became
further polarized toward vaccines and incorporated a piece of misinformation to its epistemology,
thus becoming more susceptible to polarization. But there is a third effect: the cluster also became
more negatively polarized toward the government. In this example, mistrust of vaccines is the core
value leveraged in order to shift the anti-vaccine community’s opinion of the government. We
claim that recent developments in natural language processing, specifically in the techniques of
language modeling, topic modeling, and sentiment analysis, create the possibility of an automated
capability for influencing homophilic clusters. With some initial data structuring from subjectmatter experts, this capability could automatically measure the values important to a cluster and
generate original messaging salient to those values that is designed to shift opinion on a different
set of target values. The social media environment allows for the distribution of such messaging
at scale, directly to users in the target cluster. We first present a general, top-down view of the
goals of language modeling, topic modeling, and sentiment analysis and then describe how they
could be used in concert to achieve the described influence capability.
Language Modeling
Broadly, natural language processing aims to leverage statistical modeling of textual data for
application to a large variety of automated tasks. Common examples include text classification (Is
this e-mail spam or not?), text generation (“Siri, write me a poem!”), topic modeling (What is this
large collection of documents concerned with?), and sentiment analysis (Is this sentence positive
or negative?), among many others. Before solving these “downstream tasks,” one needs to find a
way to represent text in a way that preserves a signal of its meaning and can be processed by a
computer. The task of finding such a representation is known as language modeling. More
concretely, consider a collection of text (often referred to as the corpus), T, made up of a vocabulary
of words V = { w1, ..., wN }. For each word, wi, the aim is to learn a vector, w˜i, such that words that
have a similar meaning have vector representations that are geometrically close. For example, since
the word “queen” is more similar to “king” than “orange,” a good representation should place the
vectors for king and queen closer together than the vectors for queen and orange (see Figure 3).
This begs the question: How do we define statistically what it means for two words to have a
similar meaning? To answer this question the distributive hypothesis, a concept from linguistics,
is leveraged. The distributive hypothesis states that words that have similar meanings appear in
similar textual contexts. Under the distributive hypothesis, the problem of learning a good
representation becomes as follows: for each word in the vocabulary, learn a vector in such a way
that words that appear in similar contexts have vector representations that are geometrically close.
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Figure 3. A good language model should place vector representations of similar words geometrically close.
In practice, the context of a word is defined as a window of preceding words in the corpus or a window of
words on either side (a given word can have multiple contexts).

C(wi) = (wi−m, ..., wi−1) context of the ith word is m preceding words
C(wi) = (wi−m, ..., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wi+m) context of the ith word is m words on either side
A training set of pairs of words and their respective contexts is formed from the corpus, and,
with the use of a statistical learning model, the word vectors are fit to the objective of “given a
context, predict its word.” This is exactly a “fill in the blank” task. Given how the context of a
word was defined, this objective is really “given several preceding words, predict the next word”
or “given a sequence of words with a missing word, predict the missing word.”
Roses are red, violets are _____ → [model predicts] → blue
or
Roses are _____ , violets are blue → [model predicts] → red
The fitted word vectors are retained for use as representing text in the previously mentioned
downstream tasks. But in the case that context was defined as preceding words and the model was
trained on the “predict the next word” task, the trained model can be prompted successively to
generate new pieces of text:
Roses → [model predicts] → are
Roses are → [model predicts] → red
Roses are red → [model predicts] → violets
Roses are red violets → [model predicts] → are
Roses are red violets are → [model predicts] → blue.
This generation can even be controlled to an extent if the text data has some structuring done
to it before training. For example, if training text examples are prepended with the topics they
pertain to, then the model could be controlled to generate text salient to a given topic by prompting
it with the topic itself. The language modeling approach is very general; much of the research in
natural language processing focuses on the models and techniques used to fit the representation
vectors. Currently, the models that perform best on all benchmarks are deep-learning models
known as “transformers,” which have been trained on large text datasets at the cost of millions of
dollars.
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Topic Modeling
Topic modeling aims to measure important topics that appear in a large text corpus. Intuitively it
aims to give a sense of what a collection of documents is about. Functionally, it is a two-step
process. First, important words and phrases in the corpus are identified; for example, common
“stop words,” such as articles, prepositions, pronouns, and conjunctions, are filtered out. Then, the
important words and phrases are clustered into groups that can be (if the model did a good job)
interpreted as abstract topics; these groups of phrases are then usually named by a human annotator.
For example, if one were modeling a collection of news articles having to do with a treaty process
between two countries, some measured topics might be:
agreements = [deal, treaty, peace deal, ceasefire agreement, trade representative,
climate agreement, trade commission]
defense = [security, soldiers, base, fighters, militants, weapon, militia,
conquest, patriot]
economy = [companies, exchange, capacity, wages, taxpayers, inflation,
inequality, banker, oil prices, debts, stock market].
One main use for a completed topic model is to detect the topics that are present in an
arbitrary piece of text from the same domain that the topic model was fit to. For example, given
an arbitrary news article, we could detect treaty process specific topics using the example topic
model above. There are myriad techniques for computing topic models, both leveraging
traditional statistical approaches and deep-learning techniques. One major challenge across all
techniques is evaluation of the quality of a computed topic model: the most agreed on technique
is the use of human evaluators who are subject-matter experts in the domain with which the text
corpus is concerned.
Sentiment Analysis
One of the most common downstream uses for language model representations is sentiment
analysis. Sentiment analysis aims to classify whether a given piece of text has positive, negative,
or neutral sentiment. In its simplest form it assigns one sentiment value to the entire piece of text.
For example:
I hate apples → negative
I love bananas → positive
I hate apples and love bananas → neutral.
The final example above illustrates one of the drawbacks of considering the “global” sentiment
of a piece of text and is a typical output of such algorithms. A piece of text might contain multiple
sentiments that get “averaged” when considering its overall sentiment. Topic modeling provides
an avenue to solve this problem. Given a set of topics, sentiment analysis algorithms can be trained
to detect the sentiment in a piece of text with respect to each topic. This is known as aspect-based
or topic-based sentiment analysis. For example, if we had a large corpus of sentences concerning
food and computed a topic model on it, we might find that two of the topics are “fruits” and
“vegetables.” We could then use that topic model to detect the topics present in each sentence and
label the sentence with its respective topics. If we then trained a topic-based sentiment-analysis
algorithm on the topic-labeled sentences, we could then use it to detect that the sentiment toward
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fruits in the sentence “I hate apples and love bananas” was positive and that the sentiment toward
vegetables in the same sentence was negative.
Artificial Intelligence as a Polarizing Agent
All three of the capabilities outlined in the previous section have seen explosive progress in the
past decade. Topic modeling and sentiment analysis are basic tools in the toolkits of any company
trying to understand its customers’ online behavior. For example, they are the main ingredients in
any system meant to make recommendations based on previous behavior. Downstream tasks for
language models have such a wide application in industry and academia that entire businesses are
now devoted to the expensive pretraining of large language models in order to provide them as
services (e.g., HuggingFace and OpenAI). Society has made a sizable investment in these
techniques and we should expect only to see their performance increase and their use become more
widespread. As with any emerging technology, malign actors have the opportunity to put it to use.
Society should expect this threat and craft policy to confront it.
In the previous section we saw from a modeling perspective how homophilic communities are
susceptible to influence from polarizing agents. The natural language-processing capabilities
outlined can be combined to create an automated system to deploy polarizing agents at scale on
social media. In this scenario a malign actor aims to coalesce/fragment a target community’s
opinion toward/away from a target topic. First, given a target homophilic community, topic
modeling is deployed on a large dataset of text scraped from the target community. This topic
model is cleaned and validated by human analysts and any topics corresponding to values of the
target community are noted. Next, the topic model is used by a subject-matter expert to craft a
campaign design that leverages the measured values in order to shift the community’s opinion on
the target topic. For example, to coalesce the community toward the target topic, automated
polarizing agents should inundate the community with messaging that frames community values
and the target topic positively, as well as messaging that frames community values and the target
topic negatively. To fragment the community away from the target topic, messaging should be
pushed that frames the target topic positively and community values negatively as well as
messaging that frames the target topic negatively and community values positively. In the hands
of analysts knowledgeable about the target community, the topic model could be used to craft more
intricate campaign designs.
In parallel, also using the topic model, aspect-based sentiment analysis is deployed on a large
collection of text scraped from the target community to tag each text example with its sentiment
towards the important values to the target community. This tagged dataset is then used to train a
controllable, generative language model. Such a model will be able to speak to the community in
its own parlance because it was trained on text data taken from the community, and it will be able
to speak both positively and negatively to the community’s values as each training example was
tagged with its sentiment toward those values (see Figure 4).

16

New England Journal of Public Policy

Figure 4. A process to deploy automated polarizing agents. Such agents could be used, for example, to
carry out an automated, at-scale campaign aimed to coalesce/fragment a target cluster toward/away from a
target topic through leveraging values important to the target cluster.

At this point, all the main components are in place to deploy automated polarizing agents.
Sentiment charged messaging salient to the values of the target community can now be generated
in an automated and controllable fashion according to subject-matter-expert-crafted rules. This
capability and the means of dissemination provided by social media opens the possibility of
deploying such messaging at massive scale. Significant technical challenges must be overcome to
successfully deploy this strategy, mainly the creation of a large collection of social media accounts
to push the messaging through and the corresponding command and control infrastructure to
automate the actual posting behavior. A sufficiently funded and motivated actor, however, would
surely overcome such hurdles.
At Artis we have observed evidence of such a strategy being deployed in real social media
data in ongoing research. In Figure 5 we visualize a Twitter dataset from 293,046 anonymized
Twitter accounts that were discussing gun control in the United States. Individual nodes in the
network are users, red nodes have been classified as anti-gun-control and blue users as pro-guncontrol using an automated content classifier. Edges represent retweets and are colored by the color
of the retweeting account. The network clearly has a homophilic structure. Yellow nodes were
identified as accounts who displayed statistically abnormal and coordinated posting activity; these
accounts amplified the same content in a coordinated manner. While a quantitative analysis of the
content pushed by the yellow nodes was not done, qualitative examination revealed that yellow
nodes in the anti-gun-control community were pushing content that framed gun-control measures
as dangerous to the health of the country; interestingly, yellow nodes in the pro-gun-control
community were pushing the same framing except with respect to relaxing gun-control measures.
Though we do not have evidence that the campaign messaging itself was automatically generated
in the way we describe, the coordination of the yellow nodes’ activity does speak to the existence
of a sophisticated automated command and control infrastructure. The positioning of yellow nodes
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at the centers of homophilic network components is telling as well.

Figure 5. A visualization of a Twitter dataset from 293,046 anonymized Twitter accounts concerning the
gun-control debate in the United States. Individual nodes are users, red nodes have been classified as antigun-control, and blue users as pro-gun-control using a content classifier. Yellow nodes were identified as
accounts who displayed statistically abnormal and coordinated posting activity. Edges represent retweets
and are colored by the color of the retweeting account.

Conclusion
Research into how to effectively combat homophily in online discourse is still in its early stages.
Most studies have looked into either moderation strategies or deplatforming strategies. Moderation
strategies aim to depolarize homophilic clusters through “breaking the echo chamber” in some
sense. Visually flagging misinformation, exposing users to cross-cutting content, or explicit
debunking content are some of the more popular current approaches. As discussed, however, the
psychological mechanisms that drive homophily suggest that such approaches will likely fall on
deaf ears, and modeling suggests that they are likely insufficient in the presence of polarizers. In
the research we review that looks into moderation strategies, they had little success. Deplatforming
strategies aim to identify the most extreme drivers of the discourse in homophilic clusters and cut
them off from the network. As we discussed earlier, one of the main drivers of polarization
resulting from in-group deliberation is the persuasive power wielded by the group’s most extreme
members. Deplatforming strategies have seen markedly more early success in the literature, often
resulting in the reduction of the extremity of discourse within a cluster and occasionally dissolving
a cluster significantly. There are worries that deplatforming does not do enough to depolarize users
in a cluster and merely results in a “scattering” of the cluster that could result in its reemergence.
Regardless, the problem remains and crafting any policy that effectively addresses homophily
in online discourse will surely demand input from a large intersection of expertise. As a clear first
step, continued funding should be directed to studying online interaction so that we may more
clearly understand how our discourse on the web impacts our society. While the questions are
myriad, we offer several areas where we believe future policy and research should focus attention.
As a first policy step, virtually all of the data needed to measure the social media landscape is
currently wholly in the hands of the social platforms and disseminated to researchers and other
businesses at the platforms’ discretion and for a profit. Though most platforms offer a free tier of
data collection for public use, these tiers usually represent only a small sample of available data
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and the sampling methods are opaque. One consequence of this siloing of data is the dearth of
longitudinal analyses of social media data in the literature. Most studies work with static data and
do not examine the dynamics of the network structure. To facilitate research into the dynamics of
homophily (and other relevant phenomena), platforms should be obligated to make a prescribed
amount and type of data publicly available; the extent of this obligation should be tied to the extent
that use of the platform has been adopted by the population. Such a policy must balance many
competing interests. Platforms would surely argue that much of their profitability comes, for
example, from their analysis of proprietary data. But the extent to which homophily presents on
social media clearly demonstrates that society needs a clearer picture of itself in the online space.
On the research side we believe that there are currently two main avenues of inquiry that
demand attention: exploration of strategies to reduce homophily that has already presented and
further research into the mechanisms that facilitate homophily in order to prevent its emergence in
the first place. In the first case, because of its early success, more research into the effects of
deplatforming should be conducted. Here, longitudinal data is important because the relevant
questions concern what happens to the deplatformed entity and the remaining population in the
cluster in the period following deplatforming. We also believe, despite the considerable headwinds,
that moderation strategies should continue to be investigated. Most of the moderation strategies in
the literature have relied on appeals to facts or logic; such an approach is at best neglecting the
shared beliefs that coalesce a homophilic cluster and at worst directly contradicting them. As we’ve
discussed, for messaging to resonate in a homophilic cluster, it must be congruent with the ideals
of that cluster in some sense. Any strategy that aims to reduce homophily, whether by moderation
or other means, must confront this fact. If a moderation strategy proves successful, especially one
that relies on supplying cross-cutting content, a regulatory framework in the spirit of the Federal
Communications Commission’s now defunct fairness doctrine might be erected around it.
As far as mechanisms go, we claim that there are two important types: individual mechanisms
(e.g., selective exposure) and collective mechanisms (e.g., induced structural homophily). Much
of the previous research into individual mechanisms has been in an offline context. Thus, it is
important to understand how the speed and scale of the online space interacts with previously wellestablished tendencies such as selective exposure and confirmation bias. Additionally, it is
important to understand the effects that incorporation into a homophilic cluster have on the
individual. There are multiple case studies of online activity contributing to radicalization: Can an
individual become identity-fused with an online community? With regard to collective
mechanisms, more work into the dynamics of homophilic clusters, leveraging longitudinal data, is
needed. How do homophilic clusters form? Does online interaction merely provide an efficient
means to find like others and optimize our preference for congruent information or does it play a
causal role in the formation of polarized ideals? Once clusters are formed do they ever fragment?
Under what conditions? Most important, given two disparate clusters, do they ever merge? Under
what conditions?
According to a 2021 Pew Research Poll, 69 percent of Americans use Facebook, three-quarters
of those users say they use it every day, and more than one-half of Americans say they at least
sometimes receive their news from social media. This scale of use, the tendency of social platforms
toward homophily, and the susceptibility to misinformation that that structure induces (among
other ill effects) calls for a commitment by policy makers to engage more fully with this problem.
The situation is made more urgent by the possibility of the automated capability we describe. The
Internet has democratized access to information in many ways and any policy that effectively
addresses the homophily problem on social media must do so in a manner that aims to preserve the
ideals of freedom of information and speech. The prevalence of homophily on social media,
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however, reveals much about the tension between these ideals.
A century ago, maximally free markets and the human tendency to profit maximize led to the
spontaneous development of monopolies and the massive restriction of economic mobility for
most, which, in turn, led to unprecedented regulation of the freedom of the markets in order to
increase economic mobility and a furious debate about the tension between individual and market
freedoms that continues today. Today, maximally disintermediated discourse on social media and
the human tendency to selectively expose has resulted in the spontaneous development of
homophily in online discourse, which, as noted, has resulted in a restriction in the information
landscapes of many users. This restriction, too, calls for regulation of the discourse on social media
in order to maximize users’ freedom of information and inquiry.
The need for regulated freedoms, and specifically regulated discourse, in order to maximize
the health of open society has been acknowledged since the founding of the United States. James
Madison, for example, believed that the emergence of factions (i.e., homophily) in society was
inevitable. In Federalist Papers 10, Madison lays out a series of regulations for how discourse
should be conducted in the legislature to minimize the ill effects of homophily. The ill effects of
homophily in online discourse call for similar regulation. But the unprecedented scale and speed
of online discourse necessitates a deep examination into what form such regulation should take,
lest it damage the societal good that online speech contributes. In the words of James Madison:
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it
could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it
nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to
animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.55
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